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Abstract. We propose a method tailored to the requirements of safety-critical 
embedded automotive software, named CTMCONTROL. CTMCONTROL has a par-
ticular focus on the specification-based control logic of the system under test 
and offers improvements in testing coverage metrics over a classic method 
which is routinely used in industry. The proposed method targets the Modified 
Condition/ Decision Coverage (MC/DC) objective for automotive safety-critical 
software. CTMCONTROL is validated via a controlled experiment which high-
lights the higher structural coverage delivered by the new approach. The meth-
od is implemented in the popular Matlab/Simulink/Stateflow (M/S/S) environ-
ment. 
Keywords: automotive safety-critical software, testing, MC/DC, ISO 26262, 
AUTOSAR. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
ISO 26262 [1] is one of the main points of reference in terms of safety requirements 
for automotive software. It requires the incorporation of specific coverage metrics 
which include Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC) into the process of 
testing safety-critical software. AUTOSAR, since release 4.0 in 2011 [2], refers to the 
demands of ISO 26262 for safety-relevant issues.  
One of the arguments often presented by the automotive industry in favor of wide-
ly deployed X-by-Wire or autonomous functionality in vehicles, is the fact that such 
technology has been successfully used for years in avionic software. Any move to-
wards X-by-wire or (in some capacity) autonomous vehicles would necessitate proof 
that at least the same level of quality assurance as in avionics software has been ad-
hered to. One point of interest for our research is that MC/DC coverage is required by 
DO-178C [3] for all Level A (most critical) software for airborne systems before they 
can receive an official approval/certification. 
The above facts have informed the rationale behind our proposed method, which 
we present in this paper. The proposed CTMCONTROL method is described in Section 2 
of this paper, while in Section 3 we present a controlled experiment constructed to 
validate our proposal. A synopsis of the reached conclusions is presented in Section 4.  
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2 CTMCONTROL  
The Classification Tree Method (CTM) is a model-based testing approach widely 
used and well supported by the tool-chain in the automotive industry[4]. In essence, 
the CTM approach consists of partitioning the input domain of the system under test 
(SUT) into equivalence classes. The classes correspond to ranges of values over the 
different input parameters, within which the SUT is expected to behave uniformly. 
The test cases are generated by combining the values selected from the different parti-
tions.  
CTM, while providing a clear strategy for systematic testing, gives the engineer no 
control over the degree of model coverage, and can leave parts of the control logic of 
the model unexercised. CTM, in this, behaves in line with the typical requirement-
based testing approach and does not provide assurances regarding the presence or lack 
of unintended functionality in the SUT. For example, the SUT may contain code not 
linked to requirements, which cannot be exercised by the classical requirement-based 
test generation approach. Since unintended functionality in a system is a potential 
source of unsafe behavior, complementary approaches are required.  
In avionics software (for example in the DO-178B [3] standard and its updated 
version DO-178C [5]), this issue is addressed by introducing the concept of structural 
coverage analysis. Here, the purpose of structural coverage analysis is to “determine 
which code structure was not exercised by the requirements-based test proce-
dures”[5]. This concept of structural coverage analysis is not to be confused with 
structural testing, the later understood as a set of activities that exercise the software 
with tests generated based on the source code, not the requirements. 
 Our research involves the enhancement of the CTM method with a ‘control’ as-
pect. The ‘control’ aspect in the proposed CTMCONTROL focuses on delivering MC/DC 
test coverage for the logical expressions guarding the transitions of a SUT represented 
via Statecharts [6]. While the MC/DC coverage can be targeted at different levels of 
software, in this proposed method we focus on those transitions which are visible at 
the specification level.  
To illustrate the proposed idea, we will consider the state-transition L (1) which is 
guarded by a combination of logical predicates (in our case three predicates) denoted 
for ease of explanation as A, B, C: 
 L = A ∧ B ∨¬C (1) 
If L is tested via the traditional CTM method, the tests are generated by designing 
equivalence classes for the input parameters of L and choosing one value from each of 
the partitions to test the system with. This would not guarantee that the test process 
would achieve a specific model coverage. What is more, a test process which follows 
the traditional CTM method would not directly target the ‘¬C’ portion of the transi-
tion guard. Scenarios such as ‘¬C’, are important to test not only for the presence of 
the required functionality, but crucially, to test for the absence of unwanted function-
ality. Outcomes such as unwanted activations of parts of the system, for example, 
could easily lie behind this type of algebraic representation and pose serious safety 
concerns.  
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In our proposed CTMCONTROL approach, in addition to the tests generated as per the 
classic CTM, we generate tests via a classification tree where the different classifica-
tions correspond to the logical predicates that make up the state-transition guards. 
Each of these classifications is then further partitioned into ‘True’ and ‘False’ values 
and the test cases are generated by toggling each condition between true and false and 
toggling each decision between true and false as depicted in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Test cases generated for the control aspect of CTMCONTROL 
3 Validation of the Proposed Concept 
To validate the proposed concept, we constructed a controlled experiment which in-
vestigates the differences in structural coverage achieved by the proposed 
CTMCONTROL compared with the classic CTM.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the state machine 
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As part of our strategy to ensure that there are no unintended contributors to the ex-
periment’s result, the experiment isolates for analysis one single transition T (Fig. 2). 
As part of this strategy, the SUT has four states that do not manipulate data and, dur-
ing simulation, the guards of all the transitions, bar T, are kept constant to a value that 
causes the system to remain in our transition of interest (T is evaluated in every simu-
lated second). T is guarded by logical expression (2), which has been abstracted from 
statements often found in embedded software systems: 
 A==3 AND B==1 OR C-A< 1 (2) 
Here A= [0 1 2 3 4], B= [0 1 2] and C= [0 1 2 3 4] are the input parameters of interest 
and the respective possible values they can take. 
The fact that the input parameters can only have a limited set of discrete values (ra-
ther than a range of analogue values) is part of our strategy to construct an experiment 
with a slight positive bias towards the classic CTM. This, since the limited set of dis-
crete values allows us to include each possible value in the test signal. While, if the 
parameters could take any values from a range, the test signal would be generated by 
selecting just one value from each classification of the possible range. 
To generate the tests for the MC/DC aspect of CTMCONTROL, all the atomic logic 
expressions in (1), are considered separately and each decision and condition is tog-
gled between true and false. The atomic logic expression A == 3, can be toggled be-
tween true and false respectively for the values of A= [3 0]. Similarly, the atomic 
expression B == 1 can be toggled between true to false by the values of B= [1 0]. For 
the selected values of A= [3 0], the expression C-A<1 can be toggled between true 
and false by a number of combination of values, including the values of C= [0 1 3 4]. 
These values for A, B and C form the classification classes in the MC/DC portion of 
the classification tree (Fig. 3).  
 
 
Fig. 3. MC/DC Portion of the classification tree of CTMCONTROL 
The classification classes for the classic CTM approach, consists of all the possible 
values of the input parameters A, B, C, respectively [0 1 2 3 4], [0 1 2] and [0 1 2 3 
4]. The actual tests for the classic CTM and the MC/DC portion of the CTMCONTROL 
can then be generated automatically. The test signals generated for the experiment are 
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depicted in Fig. 4, where the yellow line depicts the test signal generated for parame-
ter A, the magenta line represents the test signal for B and the cyan colored line repre-
sents C. 
 
Fig. 4.  Test signals generated via CMT approach and the MC/DC aspect of the CMTCONTROL 
The test harness built for the experiment can be run in CMT mode or in MC/DC mode 
(the latter is the MC/DC aspect of the CTMCONTROL mode). In order not to introduce a 
steep learning curve for automotive software testers, the SUT and the CTMCONTROL 
have been implemented in Stateflow [6] which is part of the 
MATLAB/Simulink/Stateflow environment that is commonly used  in the automotive 
industry. As shown in the coverage reports (Fig. 5), when the system is run in CMT 
mode, a 0% MC/DC coverage is achieved. When the system is run in MC/DC mode 
of the CMTCONTROL, a 100% coverage of the transition T is achieved. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Coverage delivered by the CTM method v. the MC/DC aspect of the CTMCONTROL. 
While achieving 100% MC/DC coverage in an MC/DC approach is not unexpected, a 
0% rate of coverage with the classic CMT shows that a whole category of errors in 
that transition would not be unearthed by its tests.  
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The fact that MC/DC has been translated into a tree structure, means that the tests 
can be generated via existing tools already used for the CMT method. CMTCONTROL 
per se allows the tester to enter the values of interest via a Graphical User Interface 
and the system generates the tests automatically using an algorithm written in 
MATLAB[6]. 
4 Conclusions 
The proposed CTMCONTROL method, in addition to incorporating the benefits of classic 
CTM, targets the MC/DC objective for safety-critical software. CTMCONTROL targets a 
class of errors which are important to test for the absence of unwanted functionality. 
Outcomes such as unwanted activations of parts of a system or unwanted feature in-
teractions could easily be the case of the type of errors targeted by CTMCONTROL. The 
proposed method does not introduce a steep learning curve for automotive software 
testers and it fits well with development environments which are popular in the auto-
motive industry, such as MATLAB/Simulink/Stateflow [6]. 
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